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A B S T R A C T  
This article is inspired by Haggerty and Ericson’s notion of the ‘surveillant 
assemblage’, which draws on philosophical concepts of Deleuze and Guattari 
in order to analyse the dynamics of contemporary increasingly extensive and 
intensifying surveillance. The surveillant assemblage has a twofold character. 
On the one hand it aims to increase visibility and on the other hand it works 
invisibly, ‘beyond our normal range of perception’. The surveillant assemblage 
offers a surveillance consensus. To disentangle this consensus this article focuses 
particularly on CCTV as a technology that is still visible. We analyse three aspects 
of the surveillance consensus, namely, correlating with the aesthetical concept 
of consensus, what we call (after Luhmann) (1) the illusion of total inclusion, 
which is hardened by (2) media arrangements and eventually by (3) regulation. 
We will refer to these three aspects empirically along with examples from the 
development of CCTV in the UK, France and Germany. 
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CCTV / France / Germany / Politics of Surveillance / UK.
Our cameras are here today providing your right to be seen and heard. 
(Promotion at the Security and Prosperity Partnership summit in Montebello. 
Quoted in Naomi Klein, The Guardian, 24 August 2007)
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Yes it works! No it doesn’t!1
The year 2008 began with an astonishing report from a German newswire 
delivering the latest story on surveillance: ‘British police admits sub stantial 
weaknesses of CCTV’ (Stefan Krempl, heise online news, 19 January 2008). 
Only a few months before, in October 2007, the Home Office and the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) had published a ‘National 
CCTV Strategy’ (Gerrard et al. 2007) which raised some concerns about 
the management and organization of the British CCTV infrastructure 
but overall confirmed the usefulness of the technology as a crime fighting 
tool. And yet the Deputy Chief Constable Graeme Gerrard, chairman of 
the ACPO CCTV subcommittee and co-author of the ‘National Strategy’, 
was admitting substantial weaknesses at a hearing in the House of Lords. 
Had the police forces of the UK, the country that more than any other 
has extensively installed CCTV in open streets to combat crime, suddenly 
reverse their position? Or does Gerrard’s admission of CCTV’s weaknesses 
simply indicate a new level of discussion? In fact, Gerrard acknowledged 
first of all the issue of overstated expectations at the hearing in the House 
of Lords Constitution Committee. His major concern went far beyond the 
question of whether CCTV works or not, revealing the political dimension 
of the issue of effectiveness:
Most of the pressure [for CCTV] comes from the public. … Some of them may get 
disappointed … it doesn’t deter most crime. I think they [the people] are perhaps 
misled in terms of the amount of crime that CCTV might prevent. (Quoted in Rosa 
Prince, Telegraph, 19 January 2008)
Public pressure? Disappointment? Crime prevention? Misleading? 
Gerrard certainly did not argue that CCTV was completely useless. He 
pointed to failings of CCTV not in general but rather specifically with 
regard to crime prevention. Since the London bombings of July 2005 this atti-
tude has been backed by public discourse about CCTV, which now places 
less emphasis on crime prevention and more on the ability to prosecute 
offenders on the basis of CCTV footage. It was just a matter of time before 
this argument collapsed as well. Indeed, a few months after Gerrard’s state-
ment, Scotland Yard CCTV expert Mike Neville called CCTV an ‘utter 
fiasco’, announcing that only 3 per cent of street robberies ‘had been solved 
by using CCTV images’ as, among other reasons, 80 per cent of them is 
of poor quality and thus useless (Telegraph, 6 May 2008). Regardless of 
whether these reports were requests for further funding, a substantial dis-
crepancy has obviously opened up between what was promised by the 
1 We borrow this phrase that indicates the ambivalent crime effects of CCTV from Ditton and 
Short (1999).
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assumed virtues of this technology and what has been achieved in reality. A 
crack had appeared in the surveillance consensus. Though manufacturers, 
politicians, the media, the public and researchers ‘have all been drivers for 
the deployment of CCTV’ (Groombridge 2008: 77), it was in particular 
the police that felt the pressure arising from the discrepancy between the 
expected and actual benefits of CCTV. They immediately responded to the 
perceived failure.
Gerrard’s and his colleagues’ intention was on the one hand to reduce 
expectations while on the other hand maintaining the general believe in the 
benefits of CCTV. The motif of effectiveness serves as a rhetorical means to 
legitimize enduring surveillance. Stemming from a complexity of cultural, 
social, economic and political issues the consensus that CCTV works has 
been constructed through the media, audits, surveys, evaluations, legislation 
and so forth. For instance, public acceptance rates for CCTV have been 
widely used not only in the UK but throughout the world to promote the 
deployment of security and surveillance technologies. In Germany just 
recently an audit stated that 83 per cent of Berlin’s population wanted 
more CCTV (Berliner Zeitung, 31 August 2007), a figure which has been 
repeated ad nauseam by various stakeholders. Also various surveys have 
con tinuously reported high levels of public support for the use of CCTV, 
unfortunately, without giving any thought to their political impact. One of 
the latest surveys on public attitudes towards CCTV – indeed carried out 
on behalf of the UK Home Office – by Spriggs et al. (2005) indicated that 
82 per cent of the respondents were ‘happy with’ the installation of CCTV 
and 80 per cent even expected CCTV to reduce crime. Moreover, 63 per 
cent believed that due to CCTV there is now a smaller number of young 
people hanging around, 69 per cent were convinced that people report 
more incidents and 56 per cent that with CCTV the police is able to respond 
more quickly (Spriggs et al. 2005). What do these number mean? Do they 
have anything to do with CCTV? Given that these numbers represent what 
is called public attitudes, with Gerrard’s statement and the various findings 
of evaluations and meta-evaluations in mind, they imply that not less than 
four out of five respondents are wrong and thus deceived with regard to the 
impact that CCTV has on crime and criminal justice.
Over the last decades the UK Home Office has spent more than three-
quarters of its crime prevention budget on funding CCTV and an estimated 
£500 million of public money has been invested in the CCTV infrastructure 
(Murakami Wood 2006: 19). Moreover, it is reported that of the five London 
boroughs with the most cameras, four have a crime-solving record that is 
below average (Evening Standard, 19 September 2007). And finally, 90 per 
cent of cameras violate the Information Commissioner’s Code of Practice 
on the use of CCTV cameras (Telegraph, 2 June 2007). Given these facts, 
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the statements of Neville and Gerrard turn out to be acknowledgements of 
a serious political scandal: the UK government has obviously ‘undermined 
civil liberties for no apparent reason’, as David Davis admitted in his spon-
taneous reply to Gerrard during the hearing. Ever since the widespread 
introduction of CCTV in the UK there have been questions regarding its 
effectiveness and the value-for-money. Many scholars and critical observers 
have articulated concerns regarding the discriminative potential of CCTV 
and its implications for civil liberties; but these concerns have been more or 
less ignored for more than a decade. However, the scandal is not just about 
the mere ignorance of some individual politicians, who have ignored the 
warnings, it is also not just that the people have been ‘perhaps misled’, as 
Gerrard fears. Paying heed only to these most immediately visible aspects 
means staying at the level of accusation and blame and thereby risking the 
distortions of reductionism. At the core of the politics of CCTV lies the 
ques tion of how, against all implausibility, CCTV has become not only a 
reality but first of all an unquestioned agreement among politicians, police 
and the people. How do liberal governments actually come to implement 
surveillance measures that continuously derogate democratic liberties and 
political rights? What are the systems of truth and justification? How is it 
possible that the sacrifice of liberty for personal security is not seen as a 
sacrifice that risks personal security?
Envisioning the surveillance consensus
Various scholars have pointed out that new forms of surveillance challenge 
conventional approaches to the theory of surveillance in terms of Foucault’s 
notion of the panopticon (Lyon 2006b). But the critique of Foucault’s trans-
formative reading of Bentham’s famous architectural regime of (in)visibility 
has led to various reconfigured frameworks for understanding contem-
porary surveillance, either overbidding the original model, e.g. Poster’s 
(1990) ‘super-panopticon’, or trying to leave it behind, e.g. Boyne’s (2000) 
‘post-panopticon’. Mathiesen’s (1997) notion of the ‘synopticon’ goes a 
step further, contrasting Foucault’s dispositif of the ‘panopticon’ – in which 
a few control the many, thereby emphasising self-discipline – with the 
synoptic character of the ‘viewer’s society,’ where many watch the few by 
media coverage in the press, on television and the Internet. Furthermore, 
Bigo’s (2006a) notion of the ‘ban-opticon’ opposes the view of scholars that 
contemporary surveillance is scrutinizing entire populations. This vision, 
Bigo (2006a: 35) argues, ‘is only the dream of a few agents of power, even if 
the rhetoric after September 11 articulates a “total” information’. Instead, 
he insists, only the few profiled as “unwelcome” are monitored by a few’.
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Within post-September 11 discussions on the state of exception, 
the ban-opticon is characterized by three major aspects: (1) ‘the way it 
excludes certain groups in the name of their future potential behavior’; 
(2) ‘the exceptionalism of power (rules of emergency and their tendency to 
become permanent)’; and (3) ‘the production of normative imperatives’ that 
‘normalizes the non-excluded’ (Bigo 2006a: 35). What makes this especially 
interesting is not that the ban-opticon may ‘deflect attention from the routine 
technologies of control’ (Lyon 2006a: 12) nor that it stresses profiling and 
dataveillance, which it does to a certain degree; rather, the visibility of 
ex clusion vanishes, while the power of exception and the production of 
normative imperatives amalgamate into a ‘governmentality’ of uncertainty, 
unease, fear and (in)security. Marx (2002) has characterized new surveil-
lance as having a tendency to become abstract. It is this abstract character 
of new surveillance that almost invalidates opposition. The ban-opticon 
‘banalizes’ both ‘the exception’ (Bigo 2006b: 47) and the technologies of 
surveillance, so ‘that nobody (including the judges) asks for their legitimacy 
and their efficiency after a certain period of time’ (2006b: 49). Indeed, 
the aim of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) is 
its invisibilisation as every visible sign of it, including cameras, indicates 
borders, conflict and exclusion, and thus would challenge the surveillance 
consensus. Hence, to prevent threats is only one side of the proactivity of 
the ban-opticon; the other is to prevent its visibility by demonstrating in 
the mass media its effectiveness to mitigate threats, which in turn become 
omnipresent.
The notions of synopticon and ban-opticon both merge the various 
drivers of surveillance with the viewer society for the sake of more (in)security, 
creating a consensus that ensures the routinization of surveillance practices, 
generates ubiquitous images of threat and suspicion, and finally guarantees 
that the spread of surveillance develops into a ‘global fifth utility’ that is as 
invisible – unless the cameras are seen – as power, gas, waste and communi-
cation and self-evident in its permanent production of exclusion (Graham 
1998; Norris et al. 2004). The consensus produces a reality that is identical 
with the pre-structured normality of the non-excluded, a simulacrum of 
an overarching visibility in which exclusion is first subjected to invisibility 
and, second, the many follow the comfortable illusion of a total inclusion. 
Therefore, liberal societies can approve of their own self-image, in which, 
according to its main imperative of mobility, everybody is free to offer their 
labour to the market or to follow commodified life in a culture of capital-
ism. As Bigo (2006a) stresses, the ban-opticon, unlike Foucault’s panopti-
con, does not immobilize bodies under an analytic gaze but rather claims 
mobility for all.
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In the following we aim to disentangle the surveillance consensus by 
briefly reviewing the rise of CCTV in the UK, France and Germany. The 
different speeds and methods of adoption point to variations in cultural, 
political, legal, political and economic traditions within these jurisdictions, 
for instance in regard to attitudes towards privacy and what is seen as the 
duty of the state, the community and the citizen (Marx 1995). At the same 
time there are common trends among these countries, such as the com-
modification of urban space and everyday life, also converting privacy and 
personal data into tradeable goods, and the changing public perception of 
security and risk that are corresponding with the governance of unease, 
fear and (in)security. In all three of these countries, deviant behaviour has 
been correlated with crime, crime with terrorism and terrorism with war, 
which ushered the ‘preventive turn’ (Narr 1998) from public safety policies 
to internal security policies that complement the logic of reactive repression 
with one of proactive prevention. All these trends, which can be traced back 
hi storically as far as the 1970s, are part of the forging of the surveillance 
consensus. However, the variations in speed and the different methods of 
adoption of public CCTV in the UK, France and Germany allow for some 
insight into the creation of this consensus. We want to focus particularly on 
three different aspects that seem to be most relevant to understanding the 
contemporary surveillance consensus. First, the postulate of total inclusion 
in advanced modern societies that blinds out CCTV as a technically medi-
ated practice of social exclusion. Second, the massive impact of the media 
in shaping the consensus. Third, the process of affirmative regulation that 
does not limit or control surveillance but dissolves the boundaries of its 
control.
Total inclusion: setting the scene of exclusion
The first permanent public CCTV scheme started operating in 1985, 
monitor ing the promenade of the English seaside town of Bournemouth. 
The town was hosting the annual Conservative Party Conference, which the 
previous year had been marked by an IRA attack in which five people were 
killed and many more injured (Norris et al. 2004: 111). Often overlooked 
in surveillance research is the fact that public area CCTV was as quickly 
adopted across the Channel in France. Although Levallois-Perret is most 
often cited as the first French city, developing an 86-camera network since 
1991, it seems that Hyères, again a seaside resort at the Côtes d’Azur, had 
already installed a large-scale CCTV system to combat street crime in the 
late 1980s (Töpfer and Helten 2005: 48). In Germany, compared to the UK 
and France, the proliferation took place more hesitantly and moderately, 
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the Saxonian city of Leipzig starting the first four-week trial with police 
video surveillance in April 1996, monitoring the area around the central 
rail way station in an effort to combat drug-related ‘street crime’. After it 
had been declared a ‘success’ by the local police department, the temporary 
instal lation was made permanent and expanded (Müller 1997). Around the 
same time, the police on the island of Sylt, northern Germany, utilized a 
surveillance camera in a pedestrian zone of the seaside resort Westerland, 
this time to protect tourists from misbehaving teenagers and punks (Töpfer 
2005: 5). Terrorism, crime, deviant behaviour – the whole spectrum of 
contexts of public CCTV was already covered by the first systems.
Is it a coincidence that in all three countries, with the exception of 
Leipzig, the first schemes were installed not in major crime-suffering cities 
but at seaside resorts? Surely it is not. We have to consider the specific cases 
to understand the consensus in its beginnings, which will also shed light on 
the eventual proliferation of CCTV. What makes Sylt a case of particular 
interest, besides the fact that we have empirical data on it, is that its status as 
an exclusive tourist site means that it is somewhat off the German political 
map, which in 1996 was characterized by a diminishing hope that the econ-
omy would recover quickly from the burden of reunification. Although 
the highly unpopular ‘Agenda 2010’ of Helmut Kohl’s successor Gerhard 
Schröder had not yet come about, on the German mainland, the model of 
German Rhine capitalism seemed well beyond its expiry date. The rising 
demand for substantial reforms both reflected and contributed to fears that 
the prosperity West Germans had been used to since the postwar period 
was over for good and that East Germans would not have the chance to 
benefit from the prosperity that they had hoped for in 1989. Additionally, 
the introduction of a common European currency and thus the end of the 
Deutsche Mark was a momentous and sometimes frightening event.
Given this situation, Sylt, known as ‘the isle of the beautiful and rich’, 
appeared to be a microcosm in which life still proceeded in peace. Therefore, 
the introduction of a single camera was hardly noticed. Compared to Leipzig, 
the issue was completely uncontested. Holiday-makers had complained 
about disturbances by loitering punks and drunken youngsters visiting the 
island. The local administrators worried that the town’s image would be 
damaged and therefore called for a partnership, which included the police, 
local businesses and social workers. Private security guards began to patrol 
the beach while the social workers established relationships with the youths, 
and CCTV was installed at the central plaza of Westerland.
The objective of this new regime of policing on Sylt is clearly not only 
to protect tourists from deviant youths. In fact the aim of the managers was 
to prevent adolescents from establishing the island as a hang out and trans-
forming it into a ‘cheap place’. Although ultimately unsuccessful, efforts 
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were even made to convince the national railway company Deutsche Bahn to 
discontinue special offers that allowed young people to travel to Westerland 
for a reduced price of DEM 35 (Die Welt, 16 March 1996).
Whether the juveniles’ behaviour was perceived as some kind of 
exces sive individualism, moral degeneracy or even social illness within this 
particular consensual environment of peacefulness and wealth was irrele-
vant once their behaviour threatened the economics of tourism. A line was 
drawn, and policing that line now meant identifying and sorting desirable 
tourists from undesirable ones based on a calculus: exclusiveness versus 
non-exclusiveness, young people with economic capabilities versus those 
without. The tourist site is the perfect illustration of a capitalist idyll, based 
on an aesthetic and socio-economic consensus. First of all, and this is true 
for all types of tourism, it is a reward system available to those in the higher 
levels of society. According to the adjusted underlying aesthetical arrange-
ments of tourism, status can be staged among equals. Socio-economic differ-
ences are eliminated as far as possible. The ‘police order’ objectifies this 
rule. Referring to Rancière, it marks a certain ‘partition of the sensible,’ 
not founding but confirming first of all an exclusive topological ‘order of 
visibility and sayability’ that allocates bodies according to their ‘names’ and 
‘activities’. The police order is in charge to ensure that ‘this activity is visible 
while those others not, that this word is understood as speech and those 
others as noise’ (Rancière 2002: 41). It ensures that those who do not count 
stay mute and that those who count form the population as a social whole, 
which in fact is a divided community.
Furthermore, the police order confirms the implicit agreement of 
sur veillance being the best means to ensure the aesthetical and economic 
setting of the scene. Accordingly, the consensus to implement CCTV in Sylt 
had three dimensions: first, a desire to disrupt or eliminate deviant behavi-
our; second, an agreement on a specific surveillance regime; and third, legit-
imation of the solution as it substantiates the existing order. The result is 
that exclusion was excluded from general perception.
In Luhmann’s (1996) terms, the dynamic of exclusion and inclusion 
is delegated to functional differentiation. Sub-systems (e.g. cheap tourism) 
ensure the inclusion of those that are excluded from another (exclusive) tour-
ism. Therefore, though exclusion takes place the ideological construction of 
total inclusion allows one to believe that it does not take place, which is an 
apt description of the way that contemporary liberal democracies function. 
‘As under these entire conditions participation is still possible,’ as Luhmann 
(1996: 230) argues, ‘one devotes oneself to an illusion of a state of inclusion 
never achieved before’. Neither those noisy fellows who do not count nor 
the mechanisms of exclusion are visible. Instead, the removal of a certain 
group from the sight of the beautiful and rich fully confirms a spatial order 
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and therefore resists objection. This finds its manifestation in the elevated 
camera which first of all represents the ‘tourist gaze’ (Urry 2002); i.e. 
seeing what that gaze expects to see. And exactly what those expectations 
are is shaped by traditions, the media and commercial advertisements, 
inscribed into the image production of the police order that, as part of an 
institutionalized partnership between local public and private agencies, 
distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable images. Thus, quite 
literally, the camera itself produces the images that the tourists wish to take 
home on their cameras according to their pre-formed expectations.
The ‘partition of the sensible’ produces a reality completely identical 
with itself, making Sylt a telling example for the surveillance consensus. The 
introduction of CCTV remained uncontested; neither its adequacy nor its 
legality was questioned. By the end of 1990s, the camera was deemed no 
longer necessary, and the system was dismantled by the tourism managers. 
Its continuing visibility was a sign of an exception that was undesirable 
in sofar as it indicated a border and thus a conflict within a space where 
dif fer ences ideally do not exist. Thus, the status quo ante, an illusion of 
total inclusion, which is a status of invisible exclusion, was regained when 
the surveil lance measure finally vanished from the tourist gaze, demanding 
surveil lance without being disturbed by surveillance. Seaside resorts, aside 
from political struggles, islands of absolute consumerism, seem to be the 
perfect test arenas for surveillance, not because of higher ac cept ance, which 
would imply whatever kind of consideration and public consciousness, 
but because they are aesthetical, socio-political diagrams of a surveillance 
consensus in more or less privatized public areas that exclude resistance and 
politics.
The media staging of the surveillance consensus
The debate over the commodification of urban space can also be understood 
as a transfer of the surveillance consensus from the tourist site to cities. 
There is probably no city council that introduced CCTV in the early 1990s 
without proposing that cameras within inner cities would increase tourism. 
Conversely, it is obvious that implementing CCTV in urban environments 
is different than in tourist destinations. In cities, the postulate of total in-
clu sion, which consequently makes exclusion invisible, is fragile and chal-
lenged constantly. In the case of CCTV, the challenges come from two sides, 
both nourishing our feelings of (in)security: first from crime and dis order; 
and second, from what has been called the return of the poor and repressed 
(who in turn become criminalized, and so we turn full circle) (Christie 1993; 
Wacquant 2008). At the edges of the sub-systems, as Luhmann (1996, 1998) 
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has put it, exclusion again becomes visible. The promise of total inclusion 
cannot be kept. Additional efforts to force the surveillance consensus are 
needed and found in extending the partnerships to systems of knowledge 
production, namely media and science, under the central topic of (in)security. 
Propagating threats of crime, terrorism, war and natural catastrophes 
and thus evoking the element of fear perfectly binds together mobile 
individuals inhibiting an increasingly complex world in a simulacrum of 
global community. This archaic mechanism has been expressed in the 
original frontispiece of Hobbes’ Leviathan and has been used repeatedly 
to forge alliances in the after math of 9/11; but it was also popular during 
elections campaigns, whether in Germany, France, the UK or elsewhere, at 
both national and local political levels. Therefore, as many scholars have 
argued in respect to 9/11, propagating (in)security is due less to exaggerated 
feelings in the first place than to a governance of unease (Bigo 2006b). In 
face of the use of purely propagandistic means in legitim ization of the Iraq 
war, Rancière (2004) noted:
It is not some felt insecurity which made the war necessary. Rather, the war was 
necessary to impose insecurity. Indeed, the management of insecurity is the most 
adequate way for our consensual State societies to function.
In the context of CCTV, crime and terrorism are the most important 
contexts to propagate its use. Camera surveillance is anything but new, 
but its wide and permanent deployment was limited more or less to private 
spaces such as banks, petrol stations, and so on. Notably, how ever, since 
the early 1990s, CCTV has spread out visibly into the public realm, and 
cameras are now connected to public efforts to combat crime, which means 
they have achieved a public value that is immediately reflected in the media. 
Yet, especially in the UK, any critical debate seemed to be banned from 
the beginning. Although the press did report the expansion of CCTV, in 
contrast to France and Germany, the dominant discourse in the UK, as 
Norris and Armstrong (1999) have shown, was ‘emphasizing effective ness’, 
‘downplaying displacement’ and stating: ‘your liberties are safe with us’ 
(McCahill and Norris March 2002: 34). Moreover it has been well reported 
that the breakthrough of CCTV in the UK took place in 1993/4 under 
the constantly broadcasted footage of the murderers of the Liverpudlian 
toddler James Bulger. On air for several days, the sequence convinced the 
British public of the usefulness of CCTV. The interaction of surveillance and 
television proved powerfully effective: television quite literally visualized the 
belief that surveillance could be a silver bullet to be used against crime, and 
any further public discussion of its actual use was subjected to the media 
staging. Advice from the Home Office’s guidebook CCTV: Looking Out For 
You, published in the context of the first round of the City Competition a 
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year after the murder of the Liverpudlian toddler, underlines the importance 
of the media as the dominant driver in the creation of the consensus:
Get the local press on your side early and get a key player on your committee 
from the start. Ensure they realise what your objectives are, and focus them on the 
shopping/walking element … it is also useful to give a high profile to all convictions 
secured as a result of CCTV. Local press and TV should be constantly reminded of 
the numbers who plead guilty and are convicted because of the cameras. (Quoted 
in Norris and Armstrong 1999: 75)
According to this advice, media communicate the idea of implementing 
a socio-technical measure to the public. It refers to the role that media play 
in promoting public support and consensual acceptance of surveillance. 
Being familiar with the power of media, the advice emphasizes that this 
is done not only by content, but by the how, the form in which a measure 
like CCTV is presented. Public opinion is never arbitrary but rather shaped. 
Media construct the understanding of what they are presenting. The mak-
ing of news implies for the majority of people the power of defining what 
is of significance. Even before an issue has been picked up by a journalist 
and transferred in one of the diverse media forms, the level of production 
describes the coding of significances and thus prearranges the level of 
reception. In this respect the advice is a perfect illustration of how the 
partition of the sensible takes place. The Home Office ensures the objectives 
of CCTV. The advice is a precise instruction on how to stage the camera as 
an actor in public perception, framing it in a context of public concern: the 
public element is sharply contrasted with the opposing element of crime, 
which CCTV will now, for the sake of public safety and protection, keep 
an eye on. Thus in this media arrangement CCTV is immediately connected 
to the public. The camera itself marks the borderline between the public 
world and the world of crime, which under the gaze of the electronic eye 
becomes manifest, countable in ‘numbers’ and consequently controllable by 
the rationality of the police order. The usefulness of the friendly eye is thus 
completely set. Its effectiveness and its legitimacy can remain unquestioned. 
Moreover, the rhetorical calculus makes reference to the apparent fact that 
crime is a threat to the public. Within this assumption lies a hidden rationale 
for constituting public identity within a circle of total inclusion, which, in 
the newly rearranged setting, the camera is itself proof of.
In other words, before CCTV became a reality of everyday life it first 
of all became a part of news stories and nationwide television shows. For in-
stance, in Germany it is possible to trace back and see that until CCTV was 
officially declared by the Ministers of Interior of the Länder in 2000 as an 
appropriate tool for fighting crime, the first deployment of camera systems 
in Leipzig and on Sylt constantly served as references for each other when 
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proponents wished to claim effectiveness and minimize concerns about 
data protection and privacy: CCTV is ‘well received among the people’ was 
the invariable assertion (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 August 1999, emphasis 
added). In other words, the tourists on Sylt were taken to be the voice of the 
social whole, despite the fact that even during prosperous times the numbers 
of those tourists are limited, not to mention that they generally come from 
a particular (exclusive) sector of society. Given this strategy, the parameters 
of public debate had already been (narrowly) defined. The common belief 
in the functioning of technology, correlating with the desire to delegate as 
much responsibility as possible to technology meant that seemingly objective 
societal aspirations of inclusion fostered the desire to join what had already 
previously been settled as consensus. Unsurprisingly, public support was 
con firmed by audits and polls, which showed acceptance rates of between 
70 and 90 per cent, these figures being then continually copied and cited by 
journalists, as numerous examples show.
Rancière (2002: 112) calls public opinion a ‘false counting’, as it 
equates the people with the counting of a part and identifies behaviour with 
what is staged as public opinion (Krasmann, forthcoming). Thus within the 
context of surveillance, the task of the media is not only to bring a particular 
technology across but to harden the consensus in the first place. But this is 
only one side of the coin. Rancière (2002: 112) asks: ‘What then implies 
the identification of the democratic opinion with polls and simulations? It 
is the actual withdrawal of the sphere of the people’s appearance.’ Thus, 
the people as political entity (‘demos’) vanish in the counting of its media 
representation. No intervention and dissent gets beyond mere articulation. 
The people disappears as it stays ‘captured in a structure of visibility, a 
struc ture, in which one sees every thing and everything is seen, and in which 
therefore no space for the appearance is left’ (Rancière 2002: 112–13).
In the UK the massive deployment of CCTV in the 1990s was promoted 
as a common effort of the British people and government to combat crime. 
Slogans such as ‘Together we’ll crack it’ emphasized the collective impetus 
of this effort. The much-vaunted British virtue of common sense, which 
trad itionally linked issues of the private and public spheres, was reduced to 
its appellative moral function while its discursive structure, confronted with 
the continuing problem of combating crime, was completely derogated. 
Therefore, the incompatible conclusions of criminologists were not able to 
provoke any kind of rethinking. Instead, an evaluation and survey campaign 
was created by the Home Office to ‘back up’ the consensus by scientific ex-
pertise. To give only one example: the outcomes of a recent survey on public 
perceptions of CCTV in residential areas seem to demonstrate that people 
are becoming aware of the overstated promises. Nonetheless, the authors 
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conclude their report by repeating exactly what was promised in the first 
place – that CCTV is a tool to fight crime:
Although CCTV remains popular, it is neither the threat to civil liberties nor the 
silver bullet that some had thought. It is evident that it is not being properly used, 
and society still has to learn to maximize its value as a crime fighting tool. This 
does need urgent attention; it was oversold in the beginning, and reduced support 
reflects evidence that the public is on to this. (Gill et al. 2007: 323)
Ambivalent regulation: enacting the surveillance 
consensus
The rule of law is an integral part of the self-conception of liberal demo-
cracies. Wherever a lack of regulation becomes manifest, the demand for 
regulation, i.e., for establishing a predictable order is articulated. Even 
though the requirement for order can be answered in different ways, to 
limit arbitrariness is the main task of any regulation. That this purpose of 
regulation does not necessarily result in a limitation of opaque surveillance 
regimes but can eventually stabilize a surveillance consensus is discussed in 
the following.
Although it is true that the expansion of CCTV in the UK took place 
without limitation by privacy or data protection acts (Maguire 1998), it 
was, however, framed by legislation: Section 163 of the UK Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 explicitly authorized local authorities to deploy 
CCTV ‘on any land in their area’. Moreover, the act released the authorities 
from their obligation to pay expensive license fees for laying CCTV cables 
pay able under the Telecommunications Act, which had been a crucial 
cost factor in the previous years (Töpfer 2007: 204). Privacy concerns 
only surfaced in 1998 when the House of Lords recommended ‘that the 
Govern ment give urgent consideration to introducing tighter control over 
any system, either publicly or privately owned, covering sites to which the 
public has free access’ (House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Tech nology, Digital Images as Evidence: Eighth Report, 1998, quoted in 
Taylor 2007: 52). As Gras (2004) argues, ‘the tenor of debate’ has indeed 
changed since then. The European Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) 
was implemented in 1998 by the UK Data Protection Act (DPA) 2000 and 
represents the first statuary regulation of CCTV surveillance in public spaces 
in the UK (Taylor 2007).
Although it does not specifically address the use of CCTV, the deci sion 
in the Durant v Financial Services Authority case of 2003 serves as a good 
example of what the DPA regulation implies. The Appeal Court refused 
access to certain records concerning a dispute between Durant and Barclays 
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Bank held by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), on the grounds that 
the data did not comply with the definition of personal data. According 
to the court, in order to qualify as such and be able to be subject to a 
complaint, the data ‘must be information that affected his privacy, whether 
in his personal or family life, business or professional capacity’. Com menting 
on the decision, the human rights organization Liberty concluded that: 
‘Mr Durant had not been able to show that the information was close enough 
to this standard’ (Crossman et al. 2007: 38). Referring to Section 1(1) of the 
DPA, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (2006: 2) argued:
In the Durant case the Court of Appeal did not consider the issue of the identifiability 
of an individual.This is often the starting point in developing an understanding of 
personal data. Instead, the Court of Appeal in this case concentrated on the mean-
ing of ‘relate to’ in that definition, identifiability not being an issue in the case.
Thus, according to the court, privacy is first of all a relational term, 
and does not refer to the individual as such. Instead, it seems connected 
to property. In the German tradition the same is true, but with a decisive 
dif fer ence. Beyond the understanding of property in relation to the private 
home or business, information privacy in the German context (Recht auf 
auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung) seems to be based on the notion ‘pro-
perty in one’s self’. Property in one’s self is understood as a pre condition 
of freedom and recognition as a legal person; and it remains untouched 
wherever a person is located. Thus, while leaving the private sphere and 
entering the public realm means in the UK becoming sub jected to public 
rules, in Germany, and elsewhere on the continent, the distinction between 
the public and the private is not drawn as strictly and clearly. Instead, the 
individual self can lay claim to being private in public as well, and indeed 
this is, as Dahrendorf (2007) argues, seen as evidence of liberty. While the 
DPA focuses on the protection of individual privacy, the court decision 
was based on a view of privacy as not encompassing more than the private 
home and the business or the professional capacity of an individual. Thus 
it must be asked – aside from considerations of poor compliance in prac-
tice (Taylor 2007) – whether the DPA was really a step forward in terms 
of a mode of regulation that limits surveillance. According to the decision 
of the Court of Appeal the DPA appears to codify an understanding of 
privacy that made the mass introduction of CCTV in public spaces possible, 
despite the social and political concerns around privacy.
The French experience can help to clarify the role of regulation. Fol-
low ing the installation of the Hyères’ public area CCTV system, the mayor 
of Avignon announced a plan to install a network of 93 public surveil-
lance cameras which, in contrast to Hyères, was supposed to record CCTV 
images. But the plan was contested by a minority in the city council and 
chal lenged in court. In June 1990, the administrative court of Marseille 
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ruled against the mayor’s plan and decided that permanent and extensive 
CCTV surveillance of public areas constituted an infringement of the right 
to privacy and the right to one’s own image. However, it also ruled that 
Avignon’s plans for an analogue surveillance system did not fall under the 
responsibility of the national data protection commission, the Commission 
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), and that the scope of 
the Data Protection Act of 1978 only covered matters of automated data 
pro cessing. Thus, the court made clear, on the one hand, that CCTV sur-
veillance may, under certain conditions (in the Avignon case, because of the 
system’s capacity to record footage), collide with the right to privacy. On the 
other hand, it indicated that authorities opting for public area surveillance 
entered an unregulated field and legal grey area (Töpfer and Helten 2005).
It took five years until the creation of a legal framework ended this 
unclear situation. In 1993, a coalition government of Gaullist (Rassemble-
ment pour la République [RPR]) and Conservatives (Union pour la Démo-
cratie Française [UDF]) under the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur came to 
power after five years of socialist government. In the Département Hauts-
de-Seine, political homeland of the new Minister for Interior, Charles 
Pasqua, his political ally Patrick Balkany, mayor of Levallois-Perret, an 
affluent suburb of Paris, had, since 1991, been developing a 96-camera 
network. Although the CNIL, struggling for influence, symbolically (as the 
system was operating without recording facilities) approved this system, it 
sparked not only local protests but a nation-wide controversy. In an effort 
to arbitrate the dispute two members of the Senate drafted a report that 
concluded that CCTV is only legal if seen as necessary for police action, 
traffic management or, in the case of private but publicly acces sible premises, 
if meant to enforce house rules. They recommended an amendment to the 
Data Protection Act and the handing over of the approval of CCTV systems 
to the supervision of the CNIL.
The results were not as expected. Spurred by the violent protests of 
youths and trade unionists against the ‘reform’ of minimum wages for 
young people that rocked the nation in March 1994, Pasqua pushed his 
Loi d’orientation et programmation relative à la sécurité no 95–73 (LOPS) 
through parliament in January 1995. One of the new measures and police 
powers legalized and regulated by the ‘Loi Pasqua’ was the video surveillance 
of both public areas and private but publicly accessible premises – if deployed 
for the purpose to protect public buildings and institutions, or if targeting 
areas with a high risk of being the target of criminal activity. According to 
Article 10 LOPS and further administrative regulations, any installation of 
CCTV in such areas had to be approved by the Prefects as representatives of 
the national government in the Départements on the basis of an opinion by 
the newly created Commission Départementale de Vidéosurveillance (CDV) 
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instead of the CNIL. These commissions were to comprise two judges (one 
judge acting as chairman), one elected local councillor, one member of the 
local chamber of commerce and one engineer. They were to assess the plans 
for new CCTV installations and their justification, to find an opinion by 
majority vote and to report their decision to the Prefect who is in charge 
of licensing the systems. Critics point to the biased composition of these 
commissions, the opaque process of nominating their members and note 
that proper checkups of license applications are hardly guaranteed, given 
the fact that only the two judges are paid for their CDV responsibilities 
(Bausch 2004; Gras 2004: 222–3).
Seven years after the passage of LOPS, demands for CCTV surveillance 
were fuelled by the then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy who, after election 
campaigns for the president’s office and the national assembly in 2002 
were dominated by law and order issues, presented a massive programme 
to combat crime. ‘Tolerance zéro’ was the leitmotif of this program that 
targeted, among others, street sex workers, ‘aggressive begging’ and youth 
gangs. To implement his program, Sarkozy announced £5.6 billion in finance 
for the modernization of law enforcement, with video surveillance being 
one of the ‘sensitive quarters’. Authorized by the ‘Loi Pasqua’ and partly 
funded by central government money, between 250 and 300 municipalities 
have opted for public area CCTV since 1995 – in particular municipalities 
in larger urban centres such as Paris, Lyon, Nice, Montpellier, Toulon, 
Lille, Mulhouse and Nancy (Töpfer and Helten 2005). In January 2006, 
the French Parliament passed an Act for Combating Terrorism and Border 
Control (Loi relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions 
diverses relatives à la sécurité et aux contrôles frontaliers n° 2006–64) that 
expanded the legal framework for the deployment of surveillance cameras. 
Minister Sarkozy was explicit in his references to the UK CCTV experience 
and the importance of CCTV footage to the eventual identification of those 
behind the London bombings in July 2005. While every company and insti-
tution is permitted to monitor the public space surrounding their premises, 
the French police can now deploy cameras for four months without the 
need for a warrant.
In July 2007, two months after Sarkozy was elected President, the 
new Interior Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie unveiled plans to expand the 
French CCTV infrastructure by tripling the number of surveillance cameras 
by 2009, and to integrate existing systems by authorizing real-time police 
access – in particular, access to the thousands of strong camera networks of 
the transport corporations SNCF and RATP and major retailers – in order 
to ‘cover as much territory as possible’ (quoted in Florian Rötzer, heise 
online news, 26 July 2007). To achieve this aim Alliot-Marie announced 
that a new Framework Bill for Internal Security (Loi d’orientation et de 
 Hempel and Töpfer The surveillance consensus 173
programmation de Sécurite intérieure) would be introduced in 2008 as the 
final step in the development of the legislation.
In the context of our discussion, the significance of the French regu-
lation is that it does not limit but affirms and legalizes an increasingly 
unlimited CCTV surveillance. Thus the legislation does not abridge fortuity 
and combat the arbitrariness of unregulated development, but erodes the 
existing law. Current legislation in this respect is best seen as a means for 
implementing the desire for unlimited observation and surveillance. This 
is all but a mere tendency. Lyon (2004: 144) argues that ‘to relax the 
limitations on previ ously stricter laws, such as those to do with wiretapping 
or indeed any mes sage interception’, has to be seen ‘as one consequence of 
9/11 and the proliferation of antiterrorist legislation’ more or less across the 
world. Such a derogation of law can take place on different levels. Ericson 
(2007: 387) has recently introduced the idea of ‘counter-law’, which has 
two aspects:
Counter-law I takes the form of passing laws that negate the traditional principles, 
standards and procedures of criminal law. Counter-law II takes the form of 
surveillance infrastructures that facilitate direct behavioral control and self-
policing without recourse to legal regulation.
CCTV combines both forms. In France anti-terrorism legislation has 
served to globalize its infrastructure as a whole and has widened its deploy-
ment within the country. As Ericson (2007: 388) argues, ‘[t]he counter-law 
regime is designed to cast the net as widely as possible’ and more import-
antly ‘there is not even a pretense of what might be termed probabilis reus: 
criminalization on the basis of actuarial knowledge of risk.’
Conclusion
‘Politics,’ as Rancière (2006) notes, ‘is when you create a kind of stage 
where you include your enemy’. Politics in this sense does not refer to the 
formal institutions of government and voting in its usual sense and cannot 
be reduced to the mere interests of diverse social groups. Rancière’s politics 
stems from the silenced position of the unarticulated and excluded. They 
articulate conflict, dissent and disagreement on the ‘partition of the sensible’ 
that determine who and what is seen and heard on that stage (Rancière 
2002). But this stage is increasingly determined by a ‘police order’, which, 
according to Rancière, also cannot be reduced to a mere organization as 
we usually understand it. Foucault’s notion of the police controlling the 
discourse (Krasmann, forthcoming) is corresponding with the ban-opticon 
dispositif of a viewer society as it replaces the political through an internal 
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and external management of the stage. This management aims to silence 
dissent over the actual partition of the sensible and, thus, produces consensus 
by eliminating conflict in response to the demands of the non-excluded. 
The increasing impossibility of articulating dissent and disagreement lies 
at the core of Rancière’s political thinking, and gives him reason to call 
our contemporary society post-democratic. The remaining question then 
is whether the emergence of the so-called surveillance society is the other 
side of this post-democratic society? The notion refers to the efforts of 
the ‘Surveillance Study Network’, which published on behalf of the UK 
Information Commissioner a ‘Report on the Surveillance Society’ in 2006. 
This report drew attention to the dangers of surveillance and led to the 
hearing where our introductory anecdote on overstated expectations took 
place. After a year long inquiry, the Home Affairs Committee rejected ‘crude 
characterizations of our society as a surveillance society’, despite noting 
that ‘the potential for surveillance of citizens in public spaces and private 
com munications has increased to the extent that ours could be described as 
a surveillance society unless trust in the Government’s intentions in relation 
to data and data sharing is preserved’ (House of Commons, Home Affairs 
Committee 2008: 10). However, there are neither reasons to worry nor 
reasons to be complacent about the Committee’s conclusion, even in face 
of common trends of automatization, function creep and integration of 
surveillance systems. Instead, the statement should be read as an urgent 
call for greater visibility and vocalization in order to crack the current 
surveillance consensus.
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